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A DISCUSSION OF ALEX WATSON’S
THE SELF’S  AWARENESS OF ITSELF .  WITH AN
ADDENDUM ABOUT THE TRANSMISSION
OF DHARMAK IRTI’S  PRAMANAVINI±CAYA*
Cristina Pecchia
If  there is any ‘central’ issue in the debates between Buddhism and the Brahmanical
schools, it is that of  the existence or non-existence of  a ‘Self ’.
ith this statement, Alex Watson introduces his rich exploration of  the
controversy over the existence of  a Self  (atman) from the point of  view
of  Bhatta Ramakantha, a 10th-century author writing from within the ±aiva
Siddhanta tradition. Ramakantha’s Nare®varapariksapraka®a (abbr.: NPP) pres-
ents a dense weave of  argumentation in favour of  the existence of  a Self,
 during which he engages himself  in genuine dialogue with other traditions.
His aim is to introduce the ±aiva Siddhanta voice into a debate that, according
to Buddhist such schools of  thought as the Vaibhasika, Sautrantika and
 Pramana, the Buddha himself  initiated. Indeed, he buttresses ±aiva Siddhanta
claims in an unprecedented dialectical foray of  fully rethinking through
 previous speculative approaches and achievements (see pp. 74-79 and 84-89).
A clear sign of  the non-sectarian bent of  his discourse – in the NPP, in partic-
ular – is his avoiding making use of  “ideas that would carry no weight in in-
ter-tradition discourse” (p. 85, n. 125).
In The Self ’s Awareness of  Itself, Watson presents this new voice within Indi-
an philosophical debate based on a large selection of  passages from the first
chapter of  NPP (the textual core of  Watson’s study) and, to a much lesser ex-
tent, from the Matangavrtti. The book opens with a thought-provoking pref-
ace and a highly informative introduction. In the latter, Watson limns the core
of  his investigation in broad brushstrokes; he describes the essential features
of  the different positions taken on the issue under examination and elabo-
rates on Ramakantha’s doctrine of  the soul within the larger context of  the
±aiva Siddhanta tradition. A “Synopsis of  the Contents of  the First Chapter
of  NPP” precedes four thematically arranged chapters in which Watson edits,
exemplarily translates and comments on the selected passages, which have
conveniently been collected in a final section (“Text Passages”) together with
textual notes. A helpful index closes the book.
* I would like to thank Alex Watson for reading a previous version of  this review article and patiently
bringing to my attention some points that I had misunderstood or misrepresented. I would also like to
thank Ernst Steinkellner for his careful reading and Philip Pierce for his revision of  my English.
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In the comments that follow the translation of  each passage, Watson ex-
plains in detail the arguments being presented, clarifying their background
and import, and giving his reasons for interpreting the text under examina-
tion one way as opposed to another. At some points, his exposition takes the
form of  a reconstruction of  segments of  the history of  Indian philosophy −
in not only an accurate but also an original way − based on a wide knowledge
of  secondary literature, but even more on a fresh look at the original sources.
As the chapter titles show, the debate about the existence of  a Self  as engaged
in by Ramakantha had a marked epistemological character, wherein a great
deal of  attention is directed to the issue of  how to cognize the Self.
The passages analyzed in the first chapter (“Can We Infer the Existence of
the Self ?”) focus on the Buddhist challenge concerning the possibility of  in-
ferring the existence of  a Self. As Watson emphasizes, Ramakantha’s view in
this regard is based on the typically Buddhist view that some phenomena can
be explained by cognition, and they do not presuppose the existence of  a Self,
as the Brahmanical schools assume. Since cognition can be perceived and is
accepted by all disputants, it serves to explain those phenomena better than
an imperceptible Self  does, a Self  whose existence is controversial. Ramakan-
tha’s exposition of  the debate surrounding this Buddhist assumption is a nec-
essary propaedeutic to his innovative version of  atmavada, in which the Self
is known directly through perception. If  the latter idea may have an an-
tecedent in a verse of  the Matanga (see p. 351, n. 76), other features reflect ideas
that can be found in the writings of  Sadyojyotis and of  Ramakantha’s father,
Narayanakantha (see pp. 100-102 and nn. 149 and 150 of  the Introduction).
The Buddhist assertion of  the superior explanatory value of  cognition over
the Self, in contrast to perceiving cognition, is appropriated to counteract first
the Naiyayika argument in favour of  the existence of  a Self  – based on the
Self  itself  rather than the various constituents of  a person – as the only plau-
sible substrate of  desire. The Naiyayika position as expounded by Ramakan-
tha agrees with Vatsyayana and some of  his commentators who claim that
the Self  inferable from desire, inasmuch as this latter can only be an effect of
the Self. The vast overview that Watson offers of  this debate is a very helpful
contribution to the more general topic of  the treatment of  desire in ancient
Indian philosophy; it allows the reader to appreciate the arguments provided
by the Vrttikara and Kumarila as well as by Naiyayika authors (pp. 140-165).
Watson explains how Ramakantha’s Naiyayika distinguishes between desire
and synthesis. For it is not desire but the synthesis (anusandhana) of  a present
act of  seeing an object and a previous experience of  pleasure derived from the
object that underlies the awareness that both acts (i.e. the present seeing and
the previous experience) have the same agent. In the Vrttikara’s and Kumar-
ila’s argument(s), desire plays the role that is played by synthesis in other ver-
sions of  the argument and it is memory, although not ultimately, that requires
the same agency (pp. 154-157).
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The next target of  Ramakantha’s Buddhist is the Vai®esika argument that
perceptible qualities such as taste must have a substrate, which can only be a
Self. The specific Sankhya argument differs in that it takes composites (samha-
ta) as having the property of  being for another’s sake, i.e. the soul, in the sense
of  “being an object of  experience for that other” (p. 196). As Watson observes,
Ramakantha surprisingly approves the Buddhist refutation of  this view,
which earlier texts within his tradition considered valid (p. 202). On the other
hand, he had silently agreed with a Buddhist, but also Sankhya, view in which
“any substrate or property-possessor over and above conglomeration of  qual-
ities” is denied (p. 185).
In the NPP passages examined in the second chapter (“Can We Know the
Self  through Self-Awareness (Svasamvedana)?”), Ramakantha moves on to re-
fute the Buddhist stance, which had held its own against Nyaya, Vai®esika and
Sankhya thought. Elaborating on a verse of  Sadyojyotis he has been com-
menting upon, he turns the Buddhist refutation of  the Self  – based on assert-
ing cognition as the witness of  all objects (p. 209) – into a ±aiva view of  the
Self. He can do this on the strength of  their common denial of  the Self  be-
yond cognition, and their common understanding of  the Self  not as “a fur-
ther entity beyond cognition” (p. 215), but simply as cognition, which reveals
itself  in its revealing of  objects.
Ramakantha’s specifically ±aiva tack is to equate cognition (jñana), more
precisely non-conceptual cognition (see pp. 368ff.), with the Self  (pp. 213ff.),
and to take being a perceiver (jñatrtva) as the ultimate form of  the Self. The
critical disagreement between the Buddhist and the ±aiva Siddhanta, then, is
– as Ramakantha puts it – about the nature of  the Self/cognition, namely
whether it is stable or momentary, and not about its existence. Against the
Buddhist view that the stability of  a Self, or a perceiver, or cognition, results
from superimposed conceptual cognition, Ramakantha asserts a stable and
undivided cognition, whose radiance is uninterrupted and self-consciousness
unbroken.
The long and detailed Chapter 3 (“Can We Perceive the Self  through I-Cog-
nition (Ahampratyaya)?”) is about Ramakantha’s discussion of  I-cognition
(ahampratyaya), a form of  perception of  the Self  which, unlike self-awareness,
is conceptual and verbal, and not entirely determined by the nature of  the
cognized object. In order to tackle the questions that this concept of  I-cogni-
tion raises, Ramakantha introduces the so-called argument from necessary
co-perception (sahopalambhaniyama). His version of  this rejects Dharmakir-
ti’s, for according to him the cognition of  blue, for instance, can occur with-
out the physical presence of  blue (pp. 262-265). This serves to prove that con-
sciousness and an object of  perception, though co-perceivable, are not
non-disparate, which is crucial to Ramakantha’s view that the Self  is real, be-
ing the referent of  I-cognition, while at the same time it is not something non-
disparate (p. 276). In Ramakantha’s opinion, this insight ought to force the
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Buddhist to accept atmasamvedanam (p. 307). Moreover, it entails that con-
sciousness of  one’s own Self  must occur whenever verbal/conceptual cogni-
tions occur – cognitions whose referents are objects of  my perception (p. 314),
which are real (pp. 319ff.). This leads on to speculations that would be worth-
while pursuing further, such as whether the cognition of  objects is dependent
on the consciousness of  one’s Self  and whether one’s own cognitions can be
shown to be distinct from those of  others, so as to allow I and you to be con-
trasted.
The passages collected in Chapter 4 (“The Equating of  Self  and Cogni-
tion”) are taken from NPP and the Matangavrtti. They illustrate Ramakan-
tha’s thought concerning the nature of  cognition, which, given its being
equated with the Self, must be unchanging. In order to account for cognition
as single both at one point in time (when it illuminates objects within a spatial
collocation) (pp. 335ff.) and over an interval of  time (pp. 338ff.), Ramakantha
shows the unwanted consequences of  ascribing plurality to cognition – an is-
sue also debated within the Buddhist tradition, in particular between the
Madhyamaka and Yogacara (p. 336, n. 8). Among other things, Ramakantha
observes that, if  the cognition of  different colours at one point in time were
due to different illuminations, “an image of  a multi-coloured cloth or suchlike
could not exist, because every atom[-like pixel] [of  the image] would be differ-
ent” (p. 336). Therefore, a plurality of  objects does not necessarily entail a plu-
rality of  cognitions. It is the faculty of  buddhi that is modified by the objects
– here including pleasure, pain and the like – and assumes their forms, pre-
senting them to the perceiver (pp. 356ff.).
In the last chapter of  the book and in various other places, too (e.g. the
comments on the ±aiva view that the Self  is an agent, at pp. 90-92), Watson
has pointed out specific doctrinal elements of  the ±aiva Siddhanta system that
have shaped Ramakantha’s philosophical discourse and imposed limits on its
scope. As Watson emphasizes:
The first chapter of  NPP represents, if  anything, a fringe phenomenon. The heart of
±aiva Siddhanta for Ramakantha is its theology and ritual; the philosophical discussion
in which theological assumptions are set aside is a thin layer at its outer edge. (p. 88)
Ramakantha’s original contribution to the development of  the ±aiva Siddhan-
ta system emerges distinctively through Watson’s observations concerning
Ramakantha’s peculiar interpretations of  Sadyojyotis’s text, of  which the
NPP is a commentary (see especially pp. 301 and 318). For, as is often the case
in the Indian commentarial tradition, Ramakantha expands on, and freely in-
terprets, issues that are sometimes only vaguely addressed in the text com-
mented upon. Our picture of  the ±aiva Siddhanta according to Ramakantha
has been cautiously but reliably enlarged through Watson’s scholarly habit of
accurately distinguishing between what can be stated with certainty and what
cannot. With similar circumspection, Watson provides evidence regarding
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authors’ sources and trends of  thought, often showing how complex respec-
tively identifying and reconstructing them can be (so complex as in some cas-
es to be finally undecidable, given the imponderable weight of  the many lost
sources). See, for instance, his treatment of  the relationship between Ra-
makantha’s text and Jayanta’s (p. 139, n. 54, and p. 150), the case of  a Vai®esika
argument (pp. 176ff.) and that of  a Sankhya view (not clearly attested in any
surviving Sankhya text) (pp. 186ff.).
Watson’s statements are consistently based on a critical approach to the
sources, accompanied by accurate philological groundwork, especially for
Ramakantha’s texts. This shows once more how exploring philosophical texts
in Sanskrit cannot count on the basic requirement of  reliable printed editions.
Watson does not overly advert to his major editorial work on the selected
NPP passages, though; if  anything, he underplays it. In his brief  sketch of  the
procedures he has followed in reconstituting these passages (section 5.4 of  the
Introduction), he outlines the genealogical relationships between the four
collated manuscripts. These were not consulted by Madhusudan Kaul for his
1926 edition and do not represent the totality of  the surviving NPP manu-
scripts (see p. 110 for further references). Watson has, to be sure, used the ev-
idence provided by the two available printed editions, and by parallel passages
as well, in particular, those from two other works by Ramakantha, the Matan-
gavrtti and the Paramoksanirasakarikavrtti (p. 110); while the footnotes testify
to an even more concerted effort to retrieve sources linked with the NPP, es-
pecially among Buddhist texts. Watson clearly aims neither at providing a crit-
ical edition of  the textual segments he discusses nor at reconstructing an ar-
chetype.1 Nonetheless, the texts he presents definitely improve on those of
the printed editions and reflect a mature critical approach to dealing with
philological issues (see, for example, n. 30 on p. 221, and n. 82 on p. 237).
For the text segment of  the Matangavrtti, which is discussed in Chapter 4,
Watson has reconsidered the variant readings recorded in the critical appara-
tus of  N. R. Bhatt’s edition (and has sometimes maybe too hastily emended
the text). The witnesses that he reports in the textual notes are mentioned un-
der “Other Abbreviations and Symbols” (pp. 44-47). Here, in each entry cor-
responding to a witness of  the Matangavrtti (implicitly, the 1977 volume con-
taining the Vidyapada), Watson informs us that he has “transcribed its
readings from the edition”. His style of  recording the variant readings evi-
dently derives from that of  the apparatus in Bhatt’s edition, which only
records the witnesses that read differently from the edited text and not what
each witness reads.2 In this type of  textual apparatus, referred to as a ‘negative
1 Though Watson mentions the “archetype” from which manuscripts B and P both derive, it is clear
from his description that he means their common (reconstructable) exemplar.
2 Bhatt does not explicitly state this in the introduction to his critical edition.
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apparatus’, the witnesses that are not mentioned are in agreement with the
edited text, or differ in such a way that the editor has judged it irrelevant to
record them. In Watson’s textual notes, then, a reading of  the Matangavrtti
edition does not represent an emendation on the part of  the editor (although
only the siglum for the edition appears) but the reading of  all witnesses that
are not mentioned within the same note.
The reading of  the Sanskrit texts and the citation of  other texts in the book
are virtually flawless.3
Throughout The Self ’s Awareness of  Itself, textual notes are presented together
with lengthy notes to the translation and the comments, so that the footnotes
are a necessary complement of  what appears in the body of  the work. They
often contain either further reasons for understanding texts in a certain way
or other viable interpretations. Readers are referred to a wide range of  San-
skrit sources and secondary literature, and also frequently to private commu-
nications with Alexis Sanderson, Harunaga Isaacson, and, for some specific
topics, Karin Preisendanz, Lambert Schmithausen, Ernst Steinkellner, and
Birgit Kellner. Through his footnotes Watson thus recreates the atmosphere
of  debate among different scholars, as if  they were seated together around a
table, discussing the text (as actually occurred, according to the Preface); and,
as is to be expected, different judgements surface. How fertile this scholarly
approach can be is shown by the invaluable contribution that the book brings
to the controversy surrounding the existence of  a Self  and, more generally,
to Saiddhantika and Tantric studies.
In the spirit of  this scholarly approach, I should like to add some observa-
tions concerning the Buddhist texts mentioned in the second chapter of  the
book. The NPP passages presented there are crucial to Ramakantha’s proof
of  the Self ’s existence, which also includes establishing that the soul is undi-
vided and stable, and not momentary. His interlocutor is a Buddhist, Dhar-
makirti, of  whom Ramakantha quotes an evidently challenging verse from
the Pramanasiddhi chapter of  the Pramanavarttika (henceforth PVa):
mithyadhyaropahanartham yatno ’saty api moktari|
An effort [must be made] to abandon false superimposition, even though there is no
one who is liberated. (PVa ii.192ab)
This verse appears within Dharmakirti’s wider discourse on the possibility of
attaining liberation in the first place, as traditionally expressed by the third
Nobles’ Truth expounded by the Buddha, namely the cessation of  suffering.
3 I shall merely signal that contrarily to what is announced on p. 169, n. 155, no other footnote follows
in the same section. Probably what was once a footnote beginning with “Preisendanz (1994: 274)” has
been incorporated into n. 155 itself. On p. 324, n. 216, there is no mention of  Dharmakirti’s use of  the
term vina®itvanumana, which is relevant for Ramakantha’s elaboration on the topic. See Steinkellner
1968, especially pp. 363ff.
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As Watson explains (p. 233), the verse replies to the question repeatedly posed
to Buddhists concerning the discontinuity between the agent who engages in
acts and the one who experiences the results of  those acts. Such discontinuity
– or, more precisely, one’s own representation of  oneself  as discontinuously
existing – would preclude action of  any kind, including acts directed towards
liberation, and would thus render the entire dharma of  the Buddha pointless.
But, as Dharmakirti says, a stable agent of  liberation is merely an idea, one
that wrongly conjures up what is only a continuum of  constituents (skandhas)
into an existent subject that undergoes transmigration. From such a perspec-
tive, it makes sense to speak of  an effort with one’s sights set on liberation as
being “unenlightened action that does not accord with reality” (p. 233). Wat-
son’s translation of  the verse makes it clear that he does not take its content
as a general, impersonal statement, but as referring to the Buddha. He thus
extends the subject of  the preceding NPP passage to the PVa verse quoted
thereafter. It may well be, however, that Ramakantha, like Narayanakantha
before him in the Mrgendratantravrtti (see p. 233, n. 65), regarded Dharmakirti’s
verse as a non-personalized assertion and, unlike the commentators on the
PVa, pointed out that such an assertion could, or should, be referred to the
Buddha, though this is not the case in the PVa. Furthermore, Ramakantha
himself  does not mention the Buddha in the Matangavrtti, where the NPP
passage here under discussion occurs again (see Watson’s remark on p. 236, n.
75). In this regard, it might be interesting to examine Tantric authors’ re-use
of  texts foreign to Tantric traditions and see whether a shift from a non-per-
sonalized discourse to a personalized one can be observed. Such a shift might
be part of  a strategy to adapt external views to the more general ideological
requirements of  the Tantric context.
It is worth noting, that Ramakantha, in referring to the type of  effort that
the Buddha himself  undertook, namely meditative experience (p. 230), insert-
ed a remark concerning this spiritual praxis that is universally absent in the
commentarial tradition relating to the PVa verse.
Ramakantha and Dharmakirti’s commentators, Prajñakaragupta (around
800) and Manorathanandin (ca. 11 cent.) in particular,4 might agree on anoth-
er point too, namely on interpreting the effort towards liberation mentioned
in the PVa verse as action based − for the Buddhist, erroneously − on assum-
ing the notion of  an existing I.
Watson has suggested that Ramakantha sees this action as “resulting from
a realization of  the falsity of  the notion of  a continuously existing ‘I’” (p. 234).
4 Steinkellner and Much 1995: 74-75 and 105. About Manorathanandin’s life there are no precise infor-
mation, but it is plausible that he lived after Ramakantha. When Watson observes that “Ramakantha may
or may not have known Prajñakaragupta’s and Manorathanandin’s interpretation” (p. 235) and that both
commentators seem to accept a claim made by Ramakantha (p. 235, n. 70), he is speaking philosophically,
not historically.
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However, according to a widely shared Buddhist opinion, reflected in Dhar-
makirti’s statement, action towards liberation is based on a pre-enlighten-
ment judgement of  the type: I am bound, I’ll be liberated. The realization5
of  the falsity of  such a judgement indicates, in fact, the attainment of  a liber-
ated state. In general, we should consider the possibility that Ramakantha ei-
ther deliberately or unintentionally misrepresented this Buddhist opinion,
but he does not seem to do so in this particular context; for he explicitly de-
scribes effort towards liberation as addressing the view of  a Self, and not as
the result of  the realization of  Selflessness. In Watson’s translation, what he
says is: ‘… the Lord Buddha … undertook effort directed towards Selflessness,
in the form of  counteracting meditation’ (p. 231). Furthermore, if  Ramakan-
tha presented his Buddhist as stating that the effort towards liberation results
from the realization of  the falsity of  the notion of  an I, that Buddhist would
be asserting that one should strive towards Selflessness, having already aban-
doned the idea, which would be contradictory. This would be irrelevant,
however, to the point Ramakantha wishes to emphasize, namely that the
Buddhist himself  asserts the non-existence of  a Self  – realization of  which he
clearly sets as his goal, while at the same time asserting the necessity of  action
for liberation.
Again, in his interpretation of  such action as that mentioned in PVa
ii.192ab, Ramakantha may not differ from Dharmakirti’s commentators in
representing Dharmakirti’s intent, but this is not Watson’s opinion (p. 235).
The Buddhist who contemplates the necessity of  effort and, at the same time,
the non-existence of  a Self  is confronting action from the standpoint of  a per-
son who still harbours an ingrained sense of  a Self  but is no longer intellec-
tually convinced of  its actuality – a standpoint that will eventually give way
to the truth underlying the conviction. Dharmakirti’s commentators illus-
trate this with the example of  the rope taken for a serpent: those who strive
to avoid a serpent, will in the end realize that it is a rope. When this happens,
they will simply see reality (tattvadar®inah, PVBh 137.16), and their mundane
outlook will no longer depend on judgements based on the idea of  a Self, on
– in Watson’s felicitous expression − “our usual unenlightened motivations
for acting” (p. 235). Therefore, those who see reality no longer undertake any
action, or rather any ordinary action, which includes effort towards liberation
(PVBh 137.17: na hi te kvacit pravartante yatnam va kurvanti|). Those who re-
main in the ordinary state, by contrast, do not act according to things as they
are, but according to their own judgement of  things, which is based on the
idea of  a Self  (PVV 77,11, quoted by Watson on p. 234). In making such state-
ments, Prajñakaragupta and Manorathanandin are not, I think, providing a
“description of  action based on selfish motives” (p. 236), but rather repeating
5 I take realization, without any adjective, as full realization, and not as intellectual realization.
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a Buddhist conception of  things that Dharmakirti and others elaborated
through the notion of  adhyaropa, ‘superimposition’, typically concerning the
notion of  an I.
When Manorathanandin comments on the false superimposition (mithyad-
hyaropa) that one needs to abandon (PVa ii.192a), he appropriately makes
clear that it is related to the objection presented in pada 190c, samsaritvad
anirmoksah. For he identifies the content of  false superimposition as the de-
terminative cognition that one is characterized by samsaric existence (samsar-
itvadhyavasaya) − and not, for example, as the more generic idea of  atman.
The opponent speaking in pada 190c points out this characterizing feature
precisely in order to argue that there cannot be liberation if  one accepts the
Buddhist denial of  the existence of  a Self; for the one who is characterized by
samsaric existence (samsaritva°) would disappear when liberation is attained,
and in the end there would be nobody who is liberated. Thus, because
Manorathanandin is explaining the meaning of  the verse in its textual con-
text, he mentions the samsarin, and not the atman. Watson’s understanding of
Manorathanandin’s commentary differs from my own, especially in not relat-
ing samsaritva to the previous context, but rather in taking it in a more general
sense, according to which the commentator “must mean that we are alarmed
by the prospect of  transmigrating endlessly” (p. 236).
The relevant passages of  Manorathanandin’s and Prajñakaragupta’s com-
mentaries accompanying Watson’s discussion of  PVa ii.192ab are not devoid
of  textual problems, which Watson takes note of  in the footnotes. For the be-
ginning of  the PVBh passage quoted on p. 234, n. 69 – kim iti hetor abhiyogah
preksavatah – he suggests the translation “What is the use of  causal [actions]
for wise people?” Faced with the problematic hetor, he offers an alternative in-
terpretation, taking “kim iti hetor to mean ‘for what reason?’ and abhiyogah as
‘striving’” (ibidem). However, following the reading in the PVBh manuscript,
hetor can be emended to hetav, obtaining the locative expected with abhiyogah.
The phrase can thus be rendered as ‘Why [should] wise people engage in
[plumbing] the cause [of  suffering] (i.e. since they already have a deep under-
standing of  things as they are)?’
With regard to PVV 77,11, Watson has cast some doubt upon the reading
avasaya, as if  it were semantically equivalent to adhyavasaya or vyavasaya (n.
68, p. 234). However, there is at least one notable occurrence of  avasaya in the
sense of  adhyavasaya in Dharmakirti’s work: idam drstam ®rutam vedam iti ya-
travasayadhih (PVa iii.324ab).
Watson has also noted that in PVa ii.191c, one might consider the reading
duhkhitvam, instead of  duhkhitam (p. 235, n. 71), although his own translation
is based on the latter. Tilmann Vetter had already offered a translation in
which he seems to silently replace duhkhitam with duhkhitvam, thus giving the
verse the sense that the combined psycho-physical constituents ascribe to a
116                                             cristina pecchia                                          [10]
Self  the fact that they are subject to unpleasant things.6 His interpretation
seems to find support in Devendrabuddhi’s commentary on the PVa text: gan
gi phyir de ltar rmons pa las bdag la sdug bsnal ñid du sgro btags nas|…” (PVP
95a1). However, considering that sdug bsnal ñid may be used to translate
duhkhata and bdag la may have a pronominal function, one might venture to
render the sentence as follows: ‘Hence, in this way, [the continuum] superim-
poses a state of  suffering upon [it]self, owing to delusion…’. In any case, the
word duhkhita is well attested as a qualifier applicable to persons, in the mean-
ing of  ‘miserable’, ‘pained’, ‘sad’,7 and it is a term that recurs in the context
of  specific themes of  the Buddhist doctrine, much in the same way as the verb
paritasyati does in pada b. Thus Dharmakirti may have chosen to adopt such
terminology in the karika, and use duhkhitam in the function of  a substantive,
‘something in pain’, to refer to the constituents when they are thought of  as
having, combined, an individual identity.
The Self ’s Awareness of  Itself sheds light on the complex views of  a philosopher
of  the aiva Siddhanta tradition, thereby accounting for the dissemination, re-
ception, and reworking of  certain crucial issues, the first seeds of  which had
been sown some centuries earlier. The book thus yields an outline of  a num-
ber of  theoretical developments within ancient Indian philosophy, a field in
which significant texts are not yet available in reliable editions and not yet ac-
companied by adequately supporting studies. This points up the importance
of  Watson’s study, which includes a new elaboration of  textual material and
the author’s own reflections on it, both of  which historians of  philosophy will
be able to integrate into broader studies. Thanks to it, Ramakantha emerges
as a more distinct personality, one who infused new energy into Indian philo-
sophical thought at the end of  the first millennium.8
Addendum
Another of  Dharmakirti’s works quoted by Ramakantha is the
Pramanavini®caya. Until 2007, when Ernst Steinkellner published a critical edi-
tion of  the first two chapters (abbr.: PVinE), the Sanskrit text of  the Pramanavi-
ni®caya was only known of  through references and citations found in other
6 Vetter 1990: 93: “[die … aus den Konstituenten bestehende Person …] …, solange schreibt sie [die
Tatsache, dass die Konstituenten] von [allerlei] unangenehmen [Dingen] betroffen werden, [diesem
nichtbestehenden Selbst] zu, leidet [dadurch].”
7 See the notable occurrence in Paramarthagatha 38 of  the Cintamayi Bhumih (in the Yogacarabhumi):
duhkhi duhkhito ’ham asmity atmanam sukhito va punar duhkham vyavasyati| – ‘[By thinking, when one is])
pained, “I am pained” – or, on the other hand (punar), [by thinking,] when one is pleased, [“I am pleased”]
–, one conceives as oneself  (i.e. as one’s Self ?) [what is in reality nothing but] Suffering.’ Both the edited
version and translation of  this passage are Schmithausen’s (1987: 232f.).
8 Bartley 2011, a recent publication on Indian philosophy, has a separate section on Ramakantha titled
“Ramakantha on the enduring individual self  and its experiences” (pp. 199-207); the subsequent section,
too, on “Personal agency” (207-209), draws largely on Ramakantha’s works.
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works. This recent edition provides an occasion to reconsider Ramakantha’s
quotations presented by Watson. In the case of  NPP 27,4-5,9 which corre-
sponds to PVinE 14,5, Watson (p. 337) does not record any variant reading for
anupalaksitah, also attested in the other texts reported by Stern (1991). The
reading in PVinE, however, is alaksitah, which is unanimously supported by
the manuscript evidence, no variants being recorded in Apparatus 2 of  the
edition. Although the reading is plausible enough to pass unnoticed in the
context, anupalaksitah of  the NPP and other witnesses may be worth recon-
sidering;10 for the term upalaksana, which appears in other passages of  the
Pramanavini®caya in a very specific sense, seems to be appropriate in PVinE 14,5
too. In PVinE 81,1,11 for example, nimittopalaksanam corresponds to the nimit-
todgrahanam mentioned in Abhidharmako®a I.14cd, there equated with samjña,
the third constituent (see Steinkellner 1979: 95, n. 350). The term upalaksana,
then, designates the cognizing, or conceptual grasping, of  specific features of
objects (here including feelings). Anupalaksitah (from anupalaksita, itself  de-
rived from this meaning of  upalaksana) would perhaps yield a better reading
than alaksitah for PVinE 14,5: ‘not being cognized conceptually’ as opposed to
‘not being characterized in a particular way’. The passage would thus express
the fact that notions (kalpana) do not “arise or pass away without being sensed
at all so that they might be unnoticed even though they exist” as notions (Wat-
son’s translation, p. 337). One may further observe that for “yena satyo ‘py alak-
sitah syuh” in PVinE 14,5 the Tibetan translation has “gan gis yod kyan mi rtogs
par ’gyur ba”,12 and for “nimittopalaksanam” in PVinE 81,1 it has “mtshan ma ñe
bar rtogs pa”.13 Thus, in both cases, rtogs pa appears in the rendering of  upalak-
sana. This seems to be a deliberate choice on the part of  the translator, be-
cause anupalaksana in PVinE 5,12, which conveys the completely different
meaning of  ‘not implying another feature’, was rendered as ma mtshon pa.14
This translation shows that the translator did not always render upa in upalak-
sana; therefore, the Tibetan translation mi rtogs par for the term in PVinE 14,5
does not imply that the Sanskrit exemplar (Ù) available to the translator had
the reading alaksitah.
A last remark to suggest a possible explanation for the fact that all manu-
scripts of  the Pramanavini®caya read alaksitah: They may all be dependent on
an exemplar where the aksaras nupa were unintentionally dropped while
9 na cemah kalpana apratisamvidita evodayante vyayante va yena satyo ‘py anupalaksitah syuh, iti.
10 It is worth noting that, in the Nyayakusumacandra, Dharmakirti’s words are used to formulate a
refutation: pratisamviditotpattivyayah satyo ‘py kalpanah|pratyaksesu na laksyeran tatsvalaksanabheda -
vat||(Pramanabhasavicarah, karika 24, p. 527); the beginning of  the explanation on kalpana na laksyeran is:
na ca satah pratisamviditavirbhavavina®avato ’nupalaksanam viruddham (Nyayakusuma candra, p. 528, line 7).
11 PVinE 80,14-81,2: tatha visayah sukhaduhkhe nimittopalaksanam ragadayo visayopalambha® ca prativid-
itaivopayanty apayantity anityah| – ‘In the same way, each [of  these factors, namely] the objects [of  the
senses]; pleasure and suffering; perception of  causes; attachment etc.; and the grasping of  objects appear
and disappear, being of  course individually registered, [and] are thus impermanent.’
12 PVin p. 50, line 20.                                                                                      13 PVinT ii, p. 30*, line 10.
14 PVin p. 38, line 3.
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copying the segment sa tyo pya nu pa la ksi tah. For given the similarity of  an
aksara with ya and the aksara pa (here following closely on one another), the
copyist’s eye may have easily jumped from pya to pa, moving from there on
to la. The plausibility of  the resulting reading would have blinded subsequent
copyists to the change that had crept into the text.
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